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TRANSCRIPTS
OF OUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE JOINT OIREACHTAS SUB COMMITTEE
ON THE BARRON REPORT INTO THE BOMBING OF KAY'S TAVERN, DUNDALK |
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| 27th SEPT 2006 | HOME
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Joint
Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights Dé Céadaoin, 27 Meán Fómhair 2006 - Wednesday, 27 September 2006
Public
Hearing on the Barron Report |
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Mr. Ó Dúlacháin: I will take some of the points. First, it has been long a subject of political commentary in relation to the period of 1973, 1974 and 1975 whether there were internal political differences within the broader British establishment as to policy in Northern Ireland. It comes through some of the historical papers that there are internal tensions - that there are elements within the security forces and the broader intelligence services and political establishment as to whether Sunningdale was an appropriate policy to adopt. There is believed to have been resistance to Sunningdale and attempts to undermine Sunningdale. Therefore, when one goes on to December 1974 and the attempt to re-establish a ceasefire, similarly, there is a belief that certain elements of the security agencies may have been quite willing to provoke violence to unseat or unsettle ceasefires. That has remained a matter of political comment and political speculation. Beyond that, anything that unseated a potential ceasefire did suit an alternative political agenda. Second, in terms of identifying the specific indicators of collusion, they go from specific court cases where people are, we believe, represented as having no known association and no previous criminal record in cases where that simply is not so. From that local type of matter, you then end up at the other end in 1980, when the trials take place in relation to the Rock Bar, and one reads the transcript of the sentencing in relation to the Rock Bar. The sentencing transcript reads very much as "This is an isolated rotten apple situation", and, therefore, the sentence is given down on that basis. Read in isolation,
it is capable of appearing very reasonable and rational until one realises
that the sentencing judge has over the previous two months sat on a number
of other trials of special patrol group officers. Therefore, when one
takes the context of what was known to that particular court, the actual
sentencing statement and rationale for the sentence handed down in the
Rock Bar trial just does not stand up. It becomes incompatible to what
is known to have been on the court record in the broadest sense, rather
than simply in that trial. That indicates a level of cover-up at that
stage involving the highest officers of state, because that was the matter
that was dealt with at that time. Ms Urwin: I
think Deputy McGrath's first question was about the first Colin Wallace
letter. He asked was it more than just a military thing. I think it has
long been known that the British were fighting a propaganda war as well.
Was it not said to Lord Widgery when he was conducting the Bloody Sunday
inquiry that we are not just fighting a military war here, we are fighting
a propaganda war? Also, according to John Weir, there was an element of
keeping the pot boiling, which is how he described it. In that way one
would get a group to carry out an atrocity to force a retaliation from
another. For example, we heard yesterday from the O'Dowd and the Reavey
families and the following night there was the retaliation in the form
of the Kingsmill massacre. John Weir certainly believes that there was
an attempt to keep the pot boiling, as he describes it. Deputy F. McGrath: It related to section 5 - Patrick Livingstone and Dublin Airport. Ms Urwin: We do not know the answer to that because we are not in a position to know. We were told by a source. We know that it happened because we have been able to find it in newspaper reports which we have provided to the committee. We know the episode took place. We do not have any way of knowing whether they were linked or whether the Garda believes they were linked. Our source told us that a special branch officer said to him after the bombing, "You were right", but that is all we know. As Judge Barron does not mention it at all in his report, we have no way of knowing. We are not in a position to know that. The Deputy asked another question about the star pistol. I have just taken one weapon. The Pat Finucane Centre will probably deal with all of the weapons and the links between them in more detail. I mentioned that one specifically for the particular reason that it is linked to the guy who owned the car at the Miami and it is also linked to the murder of Dorothy Trainor, as well as that of John Francis Greene. The Deputy asked what
I said in regard to the photographs. Again, I am not in a position to
say anything really, except that this is what happened and that it is
visual evidence that this evidence was handled in this particularly unprofessional
manner and also that it was not sent with some other material to the forensic
laboratory. Why that was the case is a different question. I do not know
the answer to that. All we can say is that we have discovered that this
happened. It would appear that the Irish Government was reluctant to get involved in this but eventually agreed. It had been intended to go ahead earlier but it was delayed until September. I have no idea why it was delayed. I am not saying the Irish Government rolled over but it certainly agreed to this co-operation. We know this from all the papers released from the National Archives in the UK. It would appear that all of the information was one-way. Questions were never asked about cross-Border incursions from the North into the South. All of the minutes detail questions and, more importantly, concerns arising about cross-Border incursions from the South into the North. Deputy Hoctor: Deputy Finian McGrath covered many of the areas on which I wished to touch. I welcome Justice for the Forgotten, Margaret, Kevin, Cormac and the families. Reference was made to research undertaken in the National Archives in the UK. How accessible were the records and how much other information which is known about was not available? There is much detail in the Wallace letters and John Weir's evidence. I am interested to know the extent of the research that has been done in co-operation with the Pat Finucane Centre. Is information available that it is not possible to get one's hands on? My second question relates to the gang that has been named as the perpetrators of the atrocities. To what extent did that gang get co-operation south of the Border. I refer in particular to the bombing incidents south of the Border in Dublin, Monaghan and Castleblaney. Did these people cross the Border, come to Dublin to plant the bomb and go away again, or did they have people working for them down here in the guise of other agencies of the State? I am interested to know if there is any evidence in this regard. On the issue of collusion and the Garda Síochána, to what extent was the Garda aware of the membership of the RUC and the various paramilitary groups that have clearly been outlined here? Do we know the extent to which the Garda was aware of the dual and perhaps triple roles played by people in that regard? Do we have any evidence that the Garda was involved in collusion? Ms Urwin referred to the European Court and the fact that it sent her back to get the Government's co-operation and to make further inquiries, in other words to get the domestic situation sorted before going back to the European Court. In Ms Urwin's opinion, how much will the element of time militate against the full pursuit of justice and the full facts in the cases we are following? In the inquiries that have taken place, including our work as a committee, all we are seeking is justice for the families. Will Ms Urwin define what would constitute justice? Would it mean that people would be charged at this stage or whenever the final conclusions are made or are apologies being sought? Various different levels of outcomes are anticipated and expected by the families and the people who are represented. Ms Urwin: The first question Deputy Hoctor asked was about the extent of the research we have done. Justice for the Forgotten has been travelling every January to London for the past four or five years to look at the newly released papers under the 30-year rule. We have found a considerable amount of material relating to Irish affairs. The British are great at keeping records and everything is written down. The Tánaiste and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform told the committee that at a certain stage in meetings the pens are put down but I say to him that as soon as he is gone out the door the pens are up again and they are writing furiously because absolutely everything is recorded by the British. They are very good at releasing a lot of their material. Obviously a lot of material is withheld but at least with the British one knows what is being withheld. It is stated when a file is closed and how long that will be the case or whether it will be closed indefinitely. One has the file number and usually the title of the file and one is pretty clear about what is being withheld. Under freedom of information orders, one can also apply for what has been withheld. We know that many files have been withheld for 1974 and 1975 and we keep those under constant review. We have already put in a freedom of information request and we will see how we get on with that. We interviewed Colin Wallace on several occasions and also Fred Holroyd and John Weir. As the committee can see, they have all given us a lot of information. In terms of the archives here, I am afraid we find very little useful information in what is released here. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform set up an academic group to look at what might be released in terms of the matter of security in Northern Ireland and The Irish Times recommended yesterday that files be released up as far as 1956. We are seeking files up to 1976 and while one appreciates that, naturally enough, not everything relating to security in Northern Ireland can be released, we would have hoped that certain files could have been released and that at least we might discover what is being withheld or how many files are being withheld. The most useful source of information here would be the Army intelligence files, the G2 files. Deputy Hoctor also
asked whether these people got assistance here. We have no way whatsoever
of knowing that. We do not know about Dublin. I would say in Border areas
they did not need any assistance. The only evidence we have of such collusion
is in respect of the Littlejohn brothers' operation here - that was an
earlier period which the committee looked at in the second Barron report
- and, of course, the case of Garda Crinnion collaborating with John Wyman,
who was a British agent. We have no evidence of any other collaboration
at this time. Deputy Hoctor: How aware was the Garda of the dual, if not triple, membership of RUC members in the underworld? Were gardaí aware of that through their own interactions and were they themselves responsible for some of it? Ms Urwin: I think that Detective Sergeant Owen Corrigan, when he appeared at the Ludlow hearings, said that there were rumours or it had come to his attention that there were allegations about members of the security forces being associated with loyalists in the 1970s. Of course, the committee has this information that was given, which I referred to during my presentation, in relation to the four RUC members, namely, the allegation that they were members of the UVF in Portadown. Certainly, gardaí at a senior level were aware of that, but again it does not appear to have gone any further because, in fairness, I suppose they would have had to give names for that or certainly the British were not going to follow it up without further information. Deputy Hoctor:
How will time militate against the final findings? In terms of the personal
type of information that is available, from our own National Library and
National Archive going right back to the Fenian police files more than
150 years ago, we know the detail that was being recorded. That same system
of intelligence has been in place, and has been in place in Northern Ireland.
We know that for every name on a Wallace list, there is a detailed file.
We know they were kept in registries. We know they were divided into two
sections - effectively, the Protestant registry and the Catholic registry.
Those registries have not been destroyed but they have never been opened
up. I would add that we may get a further and deeper insight once the McEntee report, which I believe is due to be delivered to Government at the end of October, becomes public and available to this committee. We will see further what digging can be done when the resources are applied. In so far as time and access to materials are concerned, it is more a question of will rather than of limitations. Deputy Hoctor:
What of the question regarding the outcome? Does Mr. Ó Dúlacháin
see, at the end of all of this, people being charged, or just apologies
and clear identification of people who were the perpetrators? As regards the United Kingdom, collusion has never been an unacceptable policy. It is one of the standard tools in which political affairs across the world have been managed. What seems to be unacceptable is to admit that it has been applied as a policy and, to date, the various victims have been denied an admission of truth, an admission that there is a state involvement or a state culpability. It is ultimately about the truth and the admission, as opposed to whether there are convictions or apportionment of individual or personal responsibility. Senator J. Walsh:
Of all of the information they have accumulated on all the events during
the period in question, what is our guests view on the continuation of
those two gangs, in particular, operating with impunity and the fact that
that could happen without some political acquiescence at least, if not
direction? Following up on something
Deputy Hoctor asked about collusion from here, there is no evidence of
collusion, but in a sense we must ask ourselves why did all the Garda
investigations fail so abysmally and why was it, in relation to Dundalk,
that nothing happened until Superintendent Courtney was appointed as the
Border superintendent in, I think, 1976. He then started to investigate
it, but why was nothing done in obviously what would be, even from a lay
person's point of view, the vital time immediately after any crime has
been committed? One would say that the vital time is immediately after
a crime has been committed and it was allowed to lie until Superintendent
Courtney made efforts when he was appointed in 1976. That is a serious
question. Why did all of the Garda investigations fail so abysmally? What
was the reason for that? Ms Urwin: Yes. The Portadown gang was mainly the UVF loyalist parliamentary element. Chairman: The other was the UDR-RUC element. Ms Urwin: Yes,
but they were operating together in Glennane. We will now hear from two former gardaí, former Superintendent John Courtney and former Detective Sergeant Owen Corrigan next. I welcome both men, who previously appeared before the sub-committee when it dealt with a different report by Mr. Justice Barron. They were very helpful, particularly regarding their visit to Belfast during the investigations into the Dundalk bombing, which was revealing to us and to the nation at large. I am grateful to both witnesses for attending and assisting us with the fourth Barron report on the Dundalk bombing. They are aware of the sub-committee's procedures. While members have privilege, they do not have the same privilege. The sub-committee, as a result of the Supreme Court case regarding the Abbeylara incident, is prevented from making any findings or expressions of culpability against individuals who are not Members of the Houses of the Oireachtas. No individuals are to be named. I do not know whether the witnesses had an opportunity to read the report. Does Mr. Courtney have any comment to make? Mr. John Courtney: No, I have nothing to add to my report on both investigations at the time. |