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TRANSCRIPTS
OF OUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE JOINT OIREACHTAS SUB COMMITTEE
ON THE BARRON REPORT INTO THE DUBLIN & MONAGHAN BOMBINGS |
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Joint
Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights Dé Déardaoin, 3 Feabhra 2005 - Thursday, 3 February 2005 Public
Hearing on the Barron Report |
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Éamon Ó Fiacháin: At the time of the incidents, these various bomb occurrences, I was the senior detective sergeant in the ballistics section. I was second to the member in charge, the late Detective Inspector OConnor. I should say, first, that the ballistics section was then and I suppose still is the busiest section in the technical bureau from the point of view of the amount of work done. Certainly, a miscellany of duties and obligations are imposed on members of the ballistics section because, as the name ballistics suggests, the work of the section has always included a lot more than dealing with guns and explosives. Anything not covered by the fingerprints section, the photographic section, the mapping section or the handwriting section was always referred to and dealt with by the ballistics section. Being the senior detective sergeant in the section, a lot of my time was taken up with training, lecturing to trainee detectives and scene of crime examiners. A lot of time was also taken up by court work. The work extended far beyond the examination of guns and explosives. Murder cases, housebreaking cases and fatal hit and run cases were all referred to the ballistics section. This involved a lot of attendances at court. Therefore, members of the section would be away from it very often attending court, inquests and so on. Having explained the situation in the ballistics section, priority was always accorded, had to be accorded, to those cases in which persons had been charged because dates for trial had been fixed and it was necessary to have statements, evidence ready for production in court to enable the trials to proceed. Therefore, these cases had to take priority over all other cases. I personally investigated the explosion at the film centre cinema on 26 November 1972 and the one in Sackville Place on 20 January 1973. I also attended at the scene of the car bomb in South Leinster Street, Clare Street, around the same time. I have a difficulty in that I do not have my files. I last had them at the inquest which was held early last year. On that occasion, at the end of the inquest, a chief superintendent who was in charge of the Garda witnesses, took the file. He was to return it to me but I have not received it yet. Therefore, all I have before me is what the sub-committee very kindly let me have - the report on its investigation so far. Otherwise, I am going on memory which would not be too good after 32 or 33 years, since my retirement from the Garda. I dealt directly with the explosion at the film centre cinema on 26 November 1972, at Sackville Place on 20 January 1973 and the car bomb explosion in South Leinster Street at about the same time. Chairman: I thank Éamon Ó Fiacháin. I will ask Deputies Hoctor and Finian McGrath to engage in dialogue with him. Deputy Hoctor: I welcome the various speakers. I am glad Mr. Callinan has remained also to provide clarification, if needed. I will start with a general question. How many gardaí were working in Dublin city at that time, in view of the atrocities that were threatened and had obviously occurred? Can any figure be given? Éamon Ó Fiacháin: How many gardaí in Dublin were working on the investigation? Deputy Hoctor: Yes. How many gardaí were working in Dublin city at that time? Was there an increase in numbers in view of the atrocities? Éamon Ó Fiacháin: I would not be in a position to answer that question. Deputy Hoctor: Okay. Éamon Ó Fiacháin: I am sorry. Chairman: Will Deputy Hoctor address a question to an individual garda if she would not mind? Deputy Hoctor: Okay. Éamon Ó Fiacháin: I think somebody in senior administration in the Dublin metropolitan area would probably be in a better position to answer that question. I would have no idea. Deputy Hoctor: I will clarify my question. Last year during the Barron report hearings it was made clear to us that 50 gardaí had been immediately commissioned to investigate - as an additional number - once the bombings had occurred in 1974. I was interested to know but accept Mr. Ó Fiacháin might not have the figure available. Chairman: Detective Chief Superintendent, Martin Callinan, was involved and may be able to help in that regard. Detective Chief Superintendent Callinan: Traditionally, it has always been the situation in the Garda Síochána, when serious crimes of this nature occur, that we draw on the experiences of as many personnel as is required. I am satisfied from a perusal of the files - naturally I did not examine them in any great forensic detail - that there were in excess of 50, given the volume of statements taken. It has always been the case that we gather as many as are required to do a particular job. One can imagine with three atrocities happening in 1974 within a very short period of time and again in the case the sub-committee is now looking at, that there would have been a very big effort put into the investigations of those offences. In the circumstances, extra gardaí would have been drafted in from wherever was required. Deputy Hoctor: Mr. Reynolds referred to the murders of Oliver Boyce and Breege Porter and the investigation in which he had been involved in County Donegal at the time. Mr. Hugo Boyce, brother of Oliver, was at our hearings during the week. On page 114 Mr. Justice Barron states it was most likely that they drove themselves alone to the Glen Road but Mr. Hugo Boyce was quite adamant that was a long distance away and refuted the comments of Mr. Justice Barron. I would be interested to hear Mr. Reynoldss comments. Mr. Reynolds: The position was that a number of witnesses had seen the lights of cars but could not give any description of the particular cars. They had heard hooters but in pinpointing exactly who had driven the car up the Glen Road, some suggested that it had not been driven by Boyce or Porter but we never established for definite who drove on the Glen Road in the car. Deputy Hoctor: Would Mr. Reynolds agree with the opinion at the time that this was a sectarian murder, that they were killed because they were Catholics? Mr. Reynolds: According to what we had gathered in the course of interviews with the different suspects, they had been sort of told to go in and get somebody. I think they were the words they used but they did not identify them, as far as I know, as being two Catholics or two Protestants. They knew they had an Éire registration on the car and that they were probably from the locality. They do not appear to have had any information or knowledge as to their identity. Deputy Hoctor: On Mr. Reynoldss work with the Army bomb disposal people, was there a conflict with the local authorities and the fire brigade services in that items had been washed away? He referred to the book found in the Avenger car. Was there a difficulty whereby the local authority did not always work in conjunction with the Garda or Army personnel? Mr. Reynolds: I was not involved in the investigation into the bombings here in Dublin and I would not be giving evidence on it. Mr. Hogan: It was I who mentioned it. One can picture, when this outrage happened, that everything was on fire. Loads of other cars had gone on fire as well. There were buildings with glass flying in all directions. The whole place was on fire and it had to be quenched. When the fire brigade hoses were turned on, they did not really know which was the offending car because everything would have been in a melee. I would say that is what happened - their function was to get the scene under control as soon as possible. Deputy Hoctor: I have another question on the bombings on 1 December. The first went off at almost 8 oclock and the next 15 minutes later in Sackville Place. What communications systems were in place for the Garda at the time? Obviously, there were no mobile phones. I suppose one heard information and the evidence was available visually. Mr. Hogan: At the time I was an inspector in the bureau at Johns Road. We were notified very quickly from control which was based at headquarters in Harcourt Terrace, or Harcourt Square. They were the ones who always called us when an outrage happened. They even had our home numbers. Therefore, they were on the telephone within minutes to alert us if something happened. In this case, I think we got there about 9 oclock. It came straight to the technical bureau at the time. Deputy F. McGrath: I welcome our guests and express my appreciation for their co-operation and coming to our hearings. I wish to ask Mr. Hogan about his particular job. Page 50 of the Barron report states that he actually found the handbook from the Hillman Avenger bomb car near Liberty Hall? Is that correct? Mr. Hogan: That is correct. Deputy F. McGrath: No fingerprints were found on the handbook. Mr. Hogan: No. The book was saturated with water. With all our systems at the time for developing prints, water was the greatest enemy. It was not possible to get fingermarks from it with the chemicals and development techniques we had at the time. Deputy F. McGrath: Even when Mr. Hogan dried out the book, there was no possibility of getting any fingerprints. Mr. Hogan: No, not at that point. Deputy F. McGrath: I think Mr. Hogan found a piece of putty beside the book. Is that right? Mr. Hogan: That is right. Deputy F. McGrath: Is there an innocent explanation for that or what is your view on it? Mr. Hogan: When the explosion went off, lots of windows were blown in and out all over the place. At the time we were grasping at straws. We were considering if putty would have been put around a bomb to make it more compact before the explosion. That is why we took possession of it but as I went around to the glaziers and they checked it out, they said it was more than likely that it had come from one of the windows or doors. They said often times when a person finished a job and if there was a gap, they would often put a lump of putty into the gap to just finish it off. We fingerprinted a lot of people from the glazing companies but were unable to identify the mark. Deputy F. McGrath: From his point of view, Mr. Hogan was satisfied that he had done as much as possible to gather any fingerprints in the bomb site area. He is satisfied that the maximum effort was made. Mr. Hogan: That is right. Everything that could have been done was done. Deputy F. McGrath: I wish to switch to Mr. Garvey in regard to page 51. The third paragraph states that while the marks are identifiable, they are only suitable for comparison with named suspects because of a limited area of ridged detail visible. On page 51 it is stated: While the marks are identifiable they are only suitable for comparison with named suspects because of the limited area of ridge detail visible. Photographic copies of the marks were sent to RUC Headquarters for check. A report is awaited. The inquiry has seen nothing in the Garda files to suggest a report was sent back by the RUC. Is it possible a verbal report was given or did the matter end there? Mr. Garvey: Inspector Hogan referred to that. There were verbal reports in the sense that he was in touch with fingerprint personnel in the RUC who informed him that no progress had been made. There was not any positive information forthcoming. The reports he was receiving indicated that there was no progress on his case, which was quite common. Deputy F. McGrath: No progress at all. Mr. Garvey: That arose because he knew, on a personal basis, people working in the section up there. Deputy F. McGrath: I will now ask Mr. Reynolds about the murders of Breege Porter and Oliver Boyce. The sub-committee heard submissions on this from the families last week. It is stated on page 115 that the only matter upon which the inquiry can be certain is that the gun which was used in the murder was found in the possession of a particular person - I will not name him here - and that it seems probable the knife used was that found in the possession of another person. Both of these individuals were members of the UDA. There appears to be a great deal of evidence available but the families are of the opinion that not enough was done. How does Mr. Reynolds respond to that? Is the evidence merely circumstantial, hearsay or whatever? Mr. Reynolds: The report uses the term the only matter upon which the Inquiry can be certain. It was pretty well established, even in their own submissions, that there were two guns, a .32 and a .38, and that there was another type of gun as well. There was also the dagger or knife that was found in Littles room. Some of them admitted to possessing those weapons. Little admitted that he had got the dagger from his girlfriend some time previously. They also admitted that they used the guns in some raids in the North prior to that. It was established that they did have possession of those firearms at the time. Deputy F. McGrath: Yet nothing happened and they were not charged. Mr. Reynolds: One of them was charged. Files were prepared and an incident occurred. One of those guns was brought to the laboratory in Belfast. Between the time it was left in and the finalising of the file, there was a break-in at the laboratory and that particular gun and other material were stolen. That evidence was, therefore, lost. That was the evidence submitted by the investigation team to the DPP and it was over to him then. One of them was charged in Dublin but he was acquitted. Deputy F. McGrath: I thank Mr. Reynolds. Having heard the families submissions and read page 115 of the report, it is amazing that there was not enough strong evidence and that serious charges were not brought. I will now ask Éamon Ó Fiacháin to comment on the ballistics section. In his opinion, during the period in question, 1972 to 1973, was the section up to international standards in terms of the various aspects of ballistics? He stated that there was a great deal of training going on at that time. Éamon Ó Fiacháin: I could not say it was up to international standards. It was up to the standards with which we were familiar in England, at London and Durham, and Scotland. We had attended courses dealing with investigation of bombings at these places and were familiar with their operations. Various members of the section had spent time with the bomb squads in these places and discussed affairs with them. I would be satisfied that we were reasonably up to the standards obtaining then in these countries. Deputy F. McGrath: I will leave my final question open to our five guests. In light of their professional policing backgrounds, their reading of the Barron report and their investigations into these matters, who do they believe bombed Dublin in 1972 and 1973? Were the bombings strictly the province of loyalist paramilitaries or was their an aspect of collusion? Many of the families are of the opinion it was not just loyalists and that there is evidence of collusion. Éamon Ó Fiacháin: I can speak only personally. Following my inquiries and investigations, I did not find anything that would indicate a particular origin. Suspicions are another matter. I am not dealing in suspicions. Deputy F. McGrath: Would any of our other guests like to respond? Chairman: If not, is there anyone who wishes to offer any final remarks or is everyone satisfied? We thank Brian Garvey, Hubert Reynolds, Éamon Ó Fiacháin and Martin Hogan for appearing before us today. Éamon Ó Fiacháin: Speaking for myself and, I am sure, for the others, if there are any other matters that arise we would be quite prepared to come back and deal with them. Chairman: I thank our guests. We will now move on to consider the historical context of the period again. I welcome Mr. Sean Garland and former Deputy Tomás Mac Giolla. I remind our guests that while Members of the Oireachtas enjoy privilege in these matters, they do not. We have invited Mr. Garland and Tomás Mac Giolla to appear before us in an effort to learn more about the historical context of the period and what was happening then. We would be grateful if they would make some comments in that regard. Senator Walsh and Deputy Murphy, on behalf of the committee, will then pose some questions and enter further dialogue with them. Time is of the essence because we have a commitment for 11.30 a.m. and we want to conclude at that time if possible. Mr. Sean Garland: I thank the Chairman. I have a statement, copies of which I could distribute to members of the committee. I recognise that time is short. We have read the report from Mr. Justice Barron and there are a couple of points we would like to make. In a report in The Irish Times last week about one of the sub-committees hearings it was stated people labelled republican were involved in the bombing of the film centre and we wish to comment on that matter. From the historical record, the events of 1972 were some of the worst in the history of the country from the point of view of the killings and violence that occurred. Opposition to the amendment of the Offences Against the State Act, which was proposed at the time, was one of our primary concerns. We felt that it would not solve any of the problems arising from the violence. The experience of Northern Ireland and the Republic is that repression does not defeat terrorism or alienation. This Act is still on the Statute Book and the present Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform has stated on a number of occasions, particularly at one session of the Forum on Europe that he wanted to abolish it. We should press for this to be done as quickly as possible. In general, we found the Barron report to be very loose and inconclusive. This was to be expected, given that it was difficult to compel witnesses. Mr. Justice Barron was not able to do this. It is generally accepted agents of the British Government, acting knowingly or unknowingly on its behalf, played a major part in creating serious incidents down the years. I refer to the film centre and all the talk about the Littlejohns and British agents. The Littlejohns were not British agents but criminals who used this as a cover for their own activities. They teamed up with people who lived on the Border or were from Northern Ireland and who played a part in activities against the British army here and there but, in the main, they were solely concerned with enriching themselves. When they were arrested, they used information they gathered from various sources to cut a deal for themselves. In May 1972 the Official IRA called a ceasefire in response to a call from Tomás Mac Giolla to prevent the situation spreading to sectarian civil war. The report states suspect B and associates were shot dead in 1974 by the British army and, according to the army, this happened while the army was dealing with a beer keg bomb. Another book, Index of Deaths in Northern Ireland, states these two men were shot dead by the British army having been captured; they were murdered. That is not mentioned in the report. The two men in question, Colm Rowntree and Martin McAlinden, were members of the Official IRA. I can state clearly from my experience of the two men that they were not involved or would never be involved in any activity that would lead to the death of innocent people. They were not involved in the bombing of the film centre in Dublin. We do not know who did this bombing or many of the bombings in the city afterwards. The section of the report dealing with intelligence information demonstrates how gardaí can get caught up in their work like many other people involved in intelligence operations. It is only when one comes to Detective Superintendent Fitzpatricks report that common sense and clarity come into play when he states, despite what some gardaí were saying about suspects and the Littlejohns, the Littlejohns and suspect B were in jail at the time the bombing took place at the film centre. I refer to Joe Tiernans book, The Dublin and Monaghan Bombings and the Murder Triangle. He interviewed Cathal Goulding concerning UVF members and he stated a Jim Hanna claimed the UVF at the instigation of the British Army was responsible for the Dublin bombings in 1972. This is most surprising to us. The idea that Cathal Goulding would give such an interview and not mention it to his friends or close associates is beyond belief. Before Cathal died, we were in close touch with him all the time and he never mentioned once the conversation with Jim Hanna. The fact that Mr. Tiernan did not respond to requests to attend the inquiry speaks for itself. The Official IRA had contact with and met members of the UVF, the UDA and the Provisional IRA on a number of occasions in an effort to convince these organisations that they should follow the Official IRA and declare a ceasefire and begin to develop a political programme for themselves and the people. The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association had demonstrated that mass struggle could achieve massive gains if it was properly conducted without violence and terror. The activities of sectarian organisations on both sides of the divide led to the gains made by the civil rights movement being cancelled out. The history of intelligence organisations around the world is filled with examples of individuals and groups doing things on their own or at the behest of their masters, which are never claimed nor are they held responsible. We believe in this case the British Government has a great deal to answer for and its continuing refusal to take steps, time and effort to make known all it knows is regrettable and if it is sincere about developing a climate of trust and confidence between the two countries, it must perform this necessary task. Tomás Mac Giolla: I was asked in the letter I received to set the period covered in the report in its historical, political and legislative context, with particular reference to the Offences Against the State Act. These were traumatic times beginning on 30 August 1969 when 400 houses were burned and thousands of men, women and children were made homeless. It was hugely traumatic for the country, North and South, and it was an emotional time. Everybody acted on their emotions on a number of occasions. It occurred again in January 1972 with the shooting dead of civil rights marchers and so on. The response in 1969 was amazing and enormous. Paddy Devlin and others were on television calling for guns to defend Catholics while Tim Pat Coogan came up with the IRA, I ran away slogan, which was pursued for at least two years. That was the preliminary to the setting up of the Provisional IRA and that was its purpose. There was collusion between the Government and the Army in the establishment of the Provisional IRA at that time. Four Army intelligence officers were actively engaged. I can only remember the names of two of them. Everybody knows about Captain Kelly who is still very much active. Chairman: People should not be named. |