Tomás Mac Giolla: There was a Captain Drohan at the time. He was discovered in some peculiar circumstance under a bridge with a lot of ammunition. He was never heard of after. Army and Government people were involved in the establishment of the Provisional IRA. Naturally, this affected the thinking of people in the British Government and in the North because part of the civil rights campaign was to abolish the B Specials and the special powers Act. The media reported in August 1969 that their Protestant neighbours attacked the Catholics and burned them out. That was totally untrue. Not one of the Protestant neighbours was involved in any way. It was a highly organised programme, organised by the RUC and the B Specials. The B Specials, all of whom had personal arms, did the shooting and the burning. A number of people were killed, including a young Fianna boy, and 400 houses were burned out. The B Specials and the RUC did this. The only three people arrested following that terrible night, were Billy MacMillan, the OC of Belfast, Malachy McGurn, from Lurgan, who was probably the most active civil rights campaigner in the North - he was also active down here - and Proinsias MacAirt, known locally as Frankie Cards. These three men were arrested while not one of those who carried out the dreadful acts were arrested. They were held for three or four weeks throughout August and into September, while Tim Pat Coogan was still continuing with his “IRA, I ran away” campaign.

It was natural that there would be collusion between the British Government and the paramilitaries who were now being organised and armed by the B Specials. Overnight they became a very powerful UDA and UVF, and they remain there still. The collusion was there from the beginning. We knew from the beginning that very close collusion was taking place. We accepted this as being natural and, why not, because the Irish Government was doing the same.

This is the political context that continued throughout. Internment was introduced in August 1971. There was the dreadful shooting down of civil rights marchers in Derry on 30 January 1972. That made 1972 a dreadful year. All these memories are still with these people in Belfast. One can imagine what they were like from 1969 to 1972. It was an exceptionally traumatic time. It was an extraordinarily traumatic time for us also, with the splitting up of the Provisional IRA, the split in Sinn Féin, with a group going off to join the provisionals. We were in the middle of a major campaign against the EEC, the referendum for which took place in May 1972. We were campaigning on this issue in 1971. In November 1971, the British Army surrounded me in Queen’s University. The students campaigned and got the British Army to withdraw, and then the RUC took over. Obviously they wanted to intern me, but due to the action of the students, I got out, and they conveyed me down here.

It was a very traumatic time for everyone. It was also a very political time. At the time the EEC was a major issue, particular in working class areas. There were marches in Ballyfermot to preserve the car assembly industry and 3,000 jobs. The slogan was, “Into Europe, out of work”. That was the time when Jack Lynch said that if unemployment reached 100,000 he would resign. He did not resign when it reached 200,000. When it reached 300,000 he was not around, but no one else resigned either. It was a case of “Into Europe, out of work” for 20 years, right up to 1993 or 1994.

The context of the Offences Against the State Act was preceded by other issues, including section 31 of the Broadcasting Act, the abolition of juries and setting up the Special Criminal Court, a prisons Bill to allow for prisoners to be taken into military custody in the Curragh, the dismissal of the RTE Authority and the new draconian amendment to an already draconian Offences Against the State Act. We were campaigning in the North for the abolition of the special powers Act, which was abolished in the autumn of 1969. Shortly after that dreadful programme, the B Specials were abolished, the special powers Act was abolished and the RUC appeared unarmed on the streets. RUC traffic cops were patrolling the streets, unarmed, at the end of 1969. Three of the major issues of the civil rights campaign were addressed, and the Provos destroyed the whole thing. Our campaign was for civil rights and we wanted the same down here. That is the political context.

Chairman: Obviously these events are very much in your mind, Mr. MacGiolla, and it is something that is integral to your persona. I thank you for coming here and giving that presentation.

Senator J. Walsh: In May 1972, when Tomás Mac Giolla called for a ceasefire, what was his position at that stage in Sinn Féin and was he a member of the Official IRA at the time? What position did Cathal Goulding hold at that stage?

Tomás Mac Giolla: I was the President of Sinn Féin at the time. One of the major people with me at the time calling and working for the ceasefire was Malachy McGurn. He was a most important individual at the time, North and South. Malachy and I campaigned for this. My understanding at the time was that Cathal Goulding was the Chief of Staff of the IRA. We worked on him, and he worked on others and so on. The campaign to call a ceasefire went on from January, and eventually it happened in May 1972. I made a speech in Carrickmore in July 1972. This was very effective in our movement in pointing out that no one could be bombed into a republic, and certainly no one could be bombed into a socialist republic. The idea was so outrageous that my speech became our policy from thereon.

Senator J. Walsh: I heard the comments of Mr. Garland on Joe Tiernan’s book. Joe Tiernan states that there was dialogue between the UVF and Cathal Goulding on working class issues, North and South, dealing with housing, poverty, unemployment and so on. It appears incongruous that these discussions would have gone on without Mr. MacGiolla’s knowledge, given that he was the political wing of that movement.

Mr. Garland: We had meetings with the UVF to discuss such issues. We attempted to develop a situation whereby all violence would cease on all sides. We also had meetings with the UDA and the provisionals, but they did not go on as long as the meetings with the UVF. As I said earlier, there were meetings on other occasions at which Cathal Goulding, I, and others were present.

Tomás Mac Giolla: There were also constant meetings in Long Kesh, which were very effective. Gusty Spence and people like that were there.

Senator J. Walsh: I refer to page 83 where there is a reference to contact between Cathal Goulding and Jim Hanna who was in the UVF. This is an alleged quotation from Cathal Goulding. It reads, “He asked me if the Official IRA would be willing to carry out bank robberies in the South and the UVF would claim them, and then obviously there would be a reciprocal arrangement in the North where the Official IRA would claim responsibility for UVF robberies”. He said that Army intelligence officers with whom he was in contact in the North asked him to put the proposition to us as they were anxious to bring about a situation in the South where the Dublin Government would be forced to introduce internment. Will Mr. Garland elaborate on that?

Mr. Garland: I have no knowledge whatsoever of any such conversations. It is a crazy situation. Certainly, if Cathal Goulding had been told that, he would have repeated it to us, but I never heard of it. The idea that they wanted to force the introduction of internment in the Republic - that was something we were trying to avoid at all costs. What we were trying to do was to abolish repression and repressive legislation, not introduce it.

Tomás Mac Giolla: When I saw that, the first thing I did was contact people like Seán to find out if he had heard about it. I knew Cathal very well, particularly in his last years when we had very close conversations, yet he never mentioned that. I think that is extraordinarily odd because it is something he would have told me at the time. However, he never mentioned it at any time.

Senator J. Walsh: Does Mr. Garland agree there were discussions between the movement and the UVF and UDA, but that he is unaware of the content of those discussions? All right.

I refer finally to the Film Centre bomb on 26 November 1972. I understand that Mr. Garland was familiar with suspect A and suspect B mentioned in the report, who were regarded as Official IRA activists. With regard to suspect C, was he a member of the Official IRA?

Mr. Garland: We are at a loss here because we do not know who Mr. Justice Barron knows as A, B or C. We only surmise that suspect B was one of the persons shot dead by the British Army in 1974, which is stated in the report.

Chairman: I take it they do not want any people named.

Senator J. Walsh: I am not looking for names. I gather from Mr. Garland’s original comments that suspect C was actually in jail at the time.

Mr. Garland: This is what Superintendent Fitzpatrick says in the report.

Senator J. Walsh: My question is not whether suspect C was involved in this, but was he a member of the Official IRA?

Mr. Garland: If it is the person I think it was, he would not have been a member of the Official IRA. He would have been associated with people who would have been members of the Official IRA. My knowledge of him, with the Littlejohns, was that he was not.

Tomás Mac Giolla: I do not even know how Mr. Garland thinks that.

Mr. Garland: I can give his name.

Senator J. Walsh: Mr. Garland does not have privilege. He must be related to the Littlejohns. Obviously, Mr. Garland is disclaiming any knowledge of involvement with them.

Mr. Garland: The Littlejohns had created a kind of situation where they travelled around talking to many people on the fringes of different organisations. Certainly, I never had any contact with any of them and neither had Cathal Goulding to my knowledge.

Chairman: I thank Tomás Mac Giolla and Mr. Garland for coming before the committee and helping us in this regard.

We will now move to the Justice for the Forgotten team which is represented by Ms Margaret Urwin, its secretary. Mr. Greg O’Neill acts as solicitor for the group and Cormac Ó Dúlacháin and Micheál O’Connor are part of the legal team. Cormac Ó Dúlacháin will speak first and questions will follow from Deputies Costello and Ó Feargáil.

Cormac Ó Dúlacháin: We have had the benefit of a number of days hearings before this committee. It is important to bring the committee back to the basis for the Barron report and what gave rise to that process. It arises out of a series of events in the 1970s specifically involving car bombings in 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976. These all have a common denominator, namely, that none of them were ever solved and that there is a pool of injured victims and families of deceased. These victims and families have had the common experience of never being informed about the process of Garda investigations nor being seen as material to those investigations. They have felt in many respects that they were left aside. Suspicions were aired at the time and over the years since as to who exactly was responsible for the various bombings. That question has never been satisfactorily answered for them. This process is an attempt to address that.

It was interesting to talk to some of the families after Mr. Dessie O’Malley spoke to the committee yesterday. He placed great emphasis on the fact that in 1972 the State was, effectively, faced with a threat from three illegal organisations, the Official IRA, the Provisional IRA and Saor Éire. He was talking to a group of relatives whose families had been devastated by another threat, a threat from a fourth force of some loyalist nature, with questions of whether a fifth force - a military force - was involved either behind or with it. These threats did not seem to enter the official thinking or discussions and the whole emphasis in Mr. O’Malley’s presentation was on a threat from one direction.

Mr. O’Malley spoke about the Dáil being defended by 300 soldiers on the night of 1 December 1972, whereas it appears the real threat was on the north side of the city where two bombs were placed and two busmen lost their lives. The families know there is no such thing as absolute security and that there is no way the State can protect everyone in every place at every time. However, in many respects what they had expected and believed was that if their loved one’s life was taken, the State would respond to that and those responsible would be sought out.

What emerges from the discussion today is that there can be a confusion. There are two levels to the question of who was responsible. Obviously, the Garda approached the issue first on the basis of a criminal investigation. However, there is a second sense to the question. It is the type of question that has been asked forcefully in the past few years, in New York after 11 September 2001 and in Madrid more recently. It is a broader public and political question of who is responsible, who poses the threat and what society is doing about it.

The common denominator, starting with 1 December, is a very strong emphasis coming through the media, political statements, political discussions, and even apparent from the Garda investigation, that there was a feeling, belief and suspicion that something more was behind the bombing of 1 December 1972 than simply a terrorist incident. The political significance of the timing and of the effect were all matters that were discussed and emphasised. However, the question has not been answered as to what exactly happened that night and who was responsible.

At one level what has been of assistance is the Garda Commissioner coming in today and making what is a very important concession. Perhaps “concession” is the wrong word and “development” is a more important word. The fact that families can have a direct liaison with the Garda and enter into a relationship with them may mean they will get answers to the many questions they have. It became very obvious as the gardaí who were involved in some aspect of the investigation spoke today that there is far more detail about these investigations and what was done than comes through the Barron report or simply comes through the reading of statements. It is very important for families who have had no prosecution to have the opportunity of engaging with those who were involved in investigations and of hearing the greater detail of what was done because it was done on their behalf.

It is not a State secret to hear the detail of the investigation in Buncrana or to be made aware for the first time, as we heard today, that exhibits in that investigation disappeared from the forensic laboratory in Northern Ireland. The fact that came to light from a discussion with the investigating gardaí illustrates the importance of that relationship. While the Commissioner did not see the merit of further investigation at this stage, in various submissions we have put before the sub-committee, we have indicated the continued existence of fingerprints, photofits, the identity of suspects and issues that can be subjected to further examination and investigation. Whether they will lead to prosecutions is another matter but they deserve to be looked at, considered and investigated.

What is noticeable in listening to the gardaí is how much further the process would have gone if one had had members of the RUC involved in the parallel investigation. Each of these incidents involved criminal offences in Northern Ireland. Each of these tests of vehicles had to be the subject of an investigation. Each kidnapping had to be the subject of an investigation, yet Barron has seen none of the RUC files on any of these incidents. If one goes on to consider what is really at the core of this issue, it is the response of the British Government.

It is extraordinary that two letters have come to light at this committee hearing. The first is in response to a letter by Martin Douglas who wrote to his MP in England, Nigel Evans. On 10 January Tony Blair signed a letter sent to Nigel Evans but effectively directed to Mr. Douglas. He said, “It is entirely understandable that those who have suffered the loss of loved ones still yearn to find out what happened. The British Government is committed to doing what it can to give those people the best chance of achieving that”. On the same day Tony Blair writes to the Taoiseach and concludes, “It is our judgment, given our experience of the scale of the task in identifying the relevant material in the Dublin-Monaghan and Dundalk bombings, it would not be possible to conduct another major search through our records for material relating to the 1972-73 bombings within the timescale of the inquiry”. In one letter it is committed to doing everything it can but in the other it simply is too time-consuming or involves too many resources. That has to be identified for what it is - an absolute lie.

The sub-committee heard Mr. Donlon say very clearly yesterday in his evidence that in his experience files and records of governments bear record numbers, dates and references to material contained in them. They are effectively codified and collected under various Departments and kept in a format that makes them accessible. At the outset Barron was told by the British Government that there were 64,000 files. What is relevant is not the number of files but the ease with which they can be accessed. These events happened in 1972-73. They are the first files that are relevant.

The second aspect in relation to files is that Mr. O’Malley tried to give the impression yesterday that the PSNI, when established, rid itself of all the files held by the RUC. There is no basis for that suggestion. The one thing that is certain about Northern Ireland is that for the last 30 years it has been an experiment in information-gathering and collating. If there is any place where there is a system of information management and for accessing information, it is Northern Ireland.

For the last three years we have visited the national archives in England to look at whatever files have been released. They do not adopt an overly conservative approach. In fact, there is greater access to contemporary files relating to Irish affairs in the national archives in England than there is in the National Archives in Dublin. From our examination of those files, it is very clear that they are very easily identified and accessed. Within a short period of time one becomes very aware of the personalities involved, the type of information gathered and the lines of reporting.

To turn around at the outset of the Barron process and try to create a fog of information around figures such as 68,000 files was a deception which has caused the Barron inquiry to take nearly five years to come to fruition. At the end of the process, in a letter dated 10 January directed to one victim, it is said they are committed to doing the best but they then tell the Irish Government two things - the first directed to the recommendation of this sub-committee - “No, we will not establish a Cory-style inquiry into the 1974 bombings” and, second, in relation to Mr. Justice Barron’s request, “It would not be possible to conduct a search in the timescale of the inquiry”.

The timescale of the inquiry started four years ago; it did not start on 10 January 2005. Effectively, what faces the sub-committee is as follows. In our submission these are the matters the sub-committee has to focus on. First, it should endorse the process being recommended by the Garda Commissioner because it is a very important advance, of relevance not alone to the victims of these atrocities but of many other atrocities also. Second, it has to acknowledge that it cannot simply shut up shop and accept Tony Blair’s letter as an end. Effectively, it can keep this question alive and can do so in a number of ways. It has yet to receive two further reports from Mr. Justice Barron. It can come back when all these reports have been received and, in a fuller sense, consider the question of what evidence has emerged in relation to collusion, what should be done about it and how it can be further inquired into.

If the British Government is not even willing to consider searching its files to provide whatever innocent information may be available, the Oireachtas is not powerless; it can extend the terms of a commission of investigation to at least accept further evidence of collusion. It might not need to investigate or inquire but at least there can be a source to which that evidence could be taken and subjected to further scrutiny. Second, it can decide that it will not back off and will review its decision not to hold a public inquiry. It may reconsider the recommendation in the light of that response. Third, it can do what other governments have done. Specifically in relation to the Lockerbie bombing, the American legislature decided to change its laws. It removed sovereign immunity in respect of claims involving State involvement in terrorist acts where those actions at present cannot be the matter of any court cases in this jurisdiction. The Americans and various state legislators changed their laws. If there was a problem, they simply removed it by law.

The committee can take a number of initiatives. Our submission today essentially states that this issue must be kept alive. It is absolutely unacceptable that the letter from Tony Blair should be accepted as a final note or as the end of the Barron process. It does not end there. Through the Good Friday Agreement, the Government committed itself to a process designed ultimately to ensure a society free of all violence. By focusing on these bombings we have probably brought back to people’s minds the absolute horror involved with the worst form of killing and murder, which is a public service in itself. However, we must focus on this on the basis that subversives, unlawful individuals and states are not beyond the law or beyond answer and should be amenable to investigation. This committee can keep the issue alive by simply refusing to issue a final report in which it closes the affair and wraps up.

Chairman: I thank Cormac Ó Dúlacháin. Yesterday I received a letter from the Northern Ireland Office, dated 1 February, signed personally by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mr. Paul Murphy, which states:

The present British Government welcomed the extension of Mr. Justice Barron’s inquiry into the Dublin bombings of 1972 and 1973 and I continue to have a close personal interest in his work.

We take all of Justice Barron’s requests for information seriously and seek to address these diligently where we can. However, as I have explained to Justice Barron and to the Taoiseach, it was our judgement at the time of Justice Barron’s approach regarding the Dublin bombings of 1972 and 1973 that we were not able to begin the further major and time-consuming search through records of various departments which would be necessary to assemble the material. I fear that there is therefore nothing further I could usefully add, either in writing or orally before your sub-committee, on this question.

Through the committee secretariat I have written a letter to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland asking for specific documentation on the Laneside papers and the joint intelligence committee, JIC, papers relating specifically to these matters. We are awaiting a response in this regard. We have not closed the book on this matter.

Deputy Costello: I thank Cormac O Dúlacháin and members of Justice for the Forgotten for their contribution not just today but also over the years. We have seen from the testimony given to the committee by the survivors and by families of the victims how much that group contributed when nobody else was available to help. I refer to our terms of reference, which require us within three months of having public hearings to report on any further necessary action. We are at the stage of public hearings, which are coming to a close.

We have heard the recommendations from the Justice for the Forgotten group. The victims and their families are frustrated and angry that information was not available to them and that they have not seen justice done. On the first point, that of information, we have heard from the Garda Commissioner this morning and from the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform on a previous day. They both came forward with proposals. The Garda Commissioner said he is prepared to make information available through the files and have direct contact with the victims. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform seemed to say he was prepared to establish a victims’ charter and perhaps an ombudsman and liaise with the victims. I understand from Justice for the Forgotten that the Garda Commissioner’s report was very welcome. Does it feel the approach by both the Garda Commissioner and the Minister is correct?

Cormac Ó Dúlacháin: The important matter is the openness of the engagement. On the first point, the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform invited the committee itself to view the files in the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform regarding a number of matters. Having been given that option it is important for the committee to avail of it. It is an historic step for the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform to say to parliamentarians that these files are open to them to view. As a public service, it is important for the members of the committee to take up this offer. The Minister’s second step was to indicate a greater openness to allow researchers and historical archivists access to his Department’s files. This seems to be subject to caveats and the process still needs to be worked out. However, it is a very important step in terms of trying to come to terms with an understanding of more recent events.

The third aspect, the engagement with the Garda Commissioner, is very important because it gives the opportunity in a meaningful way to explore the nature and extent of an investigation without throwing it into a forum of conflict or dispute but simply the first stage as an information process. That is very important. That level of emerging openness has to be recommended to the committee as something of which it should approve, endorse and take up. However, it has to be compared with what is happening on the other side of the island and the lack of openness and co-operation.

Deputy Costello: We got evidence that some files are missing. Mr. Justice Barron requested certain files. It was not clear whether all the files there were made available. A commission of investigation has been established to investigate missing files regarding the 1974 bombings. Does Justice for the Forgotten feel it would be necessary or desirable for the scope of that commission to be extended to include an examination of files in 1972 and 1973?

Chairman: As this may be the final question, the Deputy might consider elaborating somewhat.

Deputy Costello: My final question relates to the three letters, the last one from the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mr. Paul Murphy. Considering that we now appear to have a definitive statement from the British authorities, including the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, that they will not release documentation to the inquiry, what action does Justice for the Forgotten suggest be taken in that respect considering what we heard from Seán Donlon that all of these documents should have been perused under the 30-year rule?

Chairman: I ask for a brief reply from Cormac Ó Dúlacháin.

Cormac Ó Dúlacháin: Many of these files were perused under the 30-year rule and for the purposes of the Bloody Sunday inquiry. These events happened at the tail end of the same year. Ultimately this State must decide on the gravity of this issue and it is as far as we are concerned a fundamental breach of the European convention to fail to co-operate with these inquires, which form part of ongoing inquiries into unsolved murders. With the Stevens inquiry we have seen that an inquiry conducted many years later led to prosecutions being initiated. The failure to co-operate is a failure to co-operate with inquiries into murder, which is a breach of a state’s obligation to vindicate the right to life and this State should consider that matter.

Chairman: I thank Cormac Ó Dúlacháin and all those who contributed today. In particular, I thank the representatives of Justice for the Forgotten who have co-operated with the committee during all its hearings. I thank TG4, which has brought the hearings to a much wider audience by broadcasting them live on television. The members of the sub-committee send their condolences to the relatives of the victims who are here today. The sub-committee will do all in its power to bring closure to the suffering and grief they all feel. The sub-committee will produce a report within a few weeks. I thank our guests for their attendance.

Sitting suspended at 12.01 p.m. and resumed in private session at 12.10 p.m.

The sub-committee adjourned at 12.55 p.m. sine die.